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One of the glaring differences between personal bankrupt-
cies and sovereign "bankruptcies" is the absence of a fresh
start for sovereigns. This is largely because sovereigns cannot
declare bankruptcy in the same way that individuals can de-
clare bankruptcy.' A sovereign cannot enter into bankruptcy
in the traditional sense-creditors and a sovereign cannot be
forced to come together under an organized legal system to
discharge and restructure the sovereign-debtor's obligations.2
This obviates the sovereign's ability to declare bankruptcy in
the "straightforward" manner an individual can.
Without the ability to declare bankruptcy, sovereigns cur-
rently lack the opportunity for a financial fresh start. No insti-
tution (bankruptcy court or otherwise) has the power to force
the creditors and the debtor to the bargaining table, and thus
no institution has the power to provide the sovereign with a
fresh start like a bankruptcyjudge can for an individual. While
the judge's ability to provide an individual with a fresh start is
well founded in American jurisprudence,3 it "appears only once
in the actual text of the Bankruptcy Code [in § 1507(b)(5)]."4
All this begs the question, without an institution or a set of
laws that can facilitate a sovereign's bankruptcy proceeding, is
a fresh start ever possible? I argue that it is, at least in part.
This Note will unfold as follows. Section I will begin by examin-
ing how American bankruptcy law conceives of the fresh start
concept. Section II will look at the problem of excessive sover-
eign debt and how a sovereign's insolvency is handled when it
cannot resort to bankruptcy. Section III will argue for incorpo-
rating the fresh start policy into the current sovereign debt
restructuring regime. And Section IV will explore how the prac-
1 Martin Guzman et al., Introduction to Too LITTLE, Too LATE: THE QUEST TO
RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES XIII, XIII (Martin Guzman, Jos6 Antonio Ocampo
& Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2016) ("A fresh start for distressed
debtors is a basic principle of a well-functioning market economy. . .. But there is
no international bankruptcy framework that similarly governs sovereign debts.").
2 LEE C. BUCHHEIT ET AL., COMM. ON INT'L EcON. POL'Y & REFORM, REVISITING
SOVEREIGN BANKRUmcY IV (2013), https: //scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=5904&context=faculty-scholarship [https://perma.cc/7JEG-
3ULN] ([TIhere is no legally and politically recognized procedure for restructuring
the debt of bankrupt sovereigns.").
3 Jonathon S. Byington, The Fresh Start Canon. 69 FLA. L. REV. 115, 119
(2017) ("The Supreme Court began recognizing the fresh start policy by name as
early as 1885.").
4 Id. at 118-19. The "fresh start" language appears in Chapter 15 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the Code), which-ironically for this Note-is the section of the
Code that deals with international bankruptcies.
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tice of labelling governments illegitimate and their debts odious
can serve as a mechanism for determining what debts are dis-
chargeable, which will ultimately bring the sovereign closer to
receiving a fresh start.
I
THE FRESH START IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
The fresh start represents a few things. It is a reward pro-
vided to debtors for participating in an orderly restructuring of
their debts. It is a unifying term for the set of legal mechanisms
that provide debtors with this reward. And it is a policy objec-
tive supported by (socio)economic and moral rationales that
advocate for providing debtors with another unburdened start
to their financial life.
The United States has made the decision to provide indi-
viduals who go through bankruptcy with a fresh start.5 The
fresh start is just what it sounds like-a euphemism for provid-
ing the debtor with another unburdened start to their financial
life. 6 This is provided through discharging some of the debtor's
debts and restructuring others.7 In short, this is the debtor's
reward for working through an organized system that maxi-
mizes the creditors' returns.8 Too, it is the principal (if not sole)
reason that an individual goes into bankruptcy.9
In the United States' bankruptcy regime, the fresh start
manifests as the right to an automatic stay and the opportunity
to discharge and restructure certain debts.10 The fresh start is
achieved when the debtor is released from personal liability for
some or all unsecured prepetition debts,1" outside of a list of
5 See Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy:
A Historical Inventory and an Interpretative Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 50
(1986).
6 See, e.g., Michael D. Sousa, The Principle of Consumer Utility: A Contempo-
rary Theory of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 58 U. KAN. L. REv. 553, 562 (2010) ("This
freedom from personal liability for pre-petition debt is known as the proverbial
'fresh start.'").
7 Id. at 54-55.
8 Id.; see also Byington, supra note 3, at 122 (noting that "a historical pur-
pose of the fresh start was to increase assets available for distribution to creditors
by giving debtors a discharge to incentivize them to cooperate").
9 See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law for Productivity, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 51, 58 (2002) ("[Tihe Supreme Court has elevated [the fresh start]
into a fundamental policy of bankruptcy law with Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.") (citing
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934)).
10 See Byington, supra note 3, at 119-20.
11 Id. This set of debt can range from strictly unsecured debt, such as credit
card debt, to debt that becomes unsecured, such as debt left over from a lien-
stripping. See Discharge in Bankruptcy, U.S. CouRTs, http://www.uscourts.gov/
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enumerated exceptions.1 2 An automatic stay is the legal mech-
anism that ensures creditors do not try to collect while the
debtor is in bankruptcy, 1 3 and the discharge injunction makes
it impermissible for creditors to collect discharged prepetition
debts "after bankruptcy, the same way as the automatic stay
enjoins creditor conduct during bankruptcy."'4
The debtor receives their discharge and fresh start auto-
matically but at different intervals, depending on the chapter of
bankruptcy the debtor is filing under.'5 If a debtor is seeking
to liquidate their assets quickly under Chapter 7, then the
discharge is usually ordered four months after filing the bank-
ruptcy petition.16 If the debtor is seeking to restructure under
Chapter 13, then the discharge is ordered much later, usually
after the debtor's three-to-five year plan is satisfied.17
Creditor-debtor relations involve two sets of competing
rights-the creditors' right in getting repaid and debtors' right
in ridding themselves of burdensome debt. A bankruptcy re-
gime that starkly favors creditors' rights will not suffice as it
will alienate debtors; nor will a regime that starkly favors debt-
ors' rights as it will alienate creditors. The fresh start grapples
with this dilemma and operates as a compromise under which
debtors are rewarded once they have done enough to satisfy (in
the eyes of the law) their creditors. This balanced approach,
although, developed gradually. The fresh start historically
existed to maximize creditor returns,'8 but that objective
quickly tapered off' 9 and a more balanced fresh start policy
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/discharge-bankruptcy-bankrupt
cy-basics [https://perma.cc/GD76-MK74 (last visited Feb. 9, 2019).
12 See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012) (listing the exceptions to discharge).
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (describing automatic stays); see also ELIZABETH
WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 67, 69 (7th ed. 2014) (explaining
that the basic function of the automatic stay is to halt all collection activities in its
various forms against the debtor's property and, secondly, to punish creditors if
they try to pursue collection in violation of the stay).
14 WARREN ET AL., supra note 13, at 155.
15 See Discharge in Bankruptcy, supra note 11.
16 Id.
17 Id. The Chapter 13 debtor's plan is satisfied once the debtor completes the
required payments under the repayment plan, which is itself approved by the
court shortly after the debtor files the petition.
18 See Byington, supra note 3, at 122 n.35 (quoting Discussion, LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 123, 148 ) ("[D]ischarge was a reward offered by
the creditors to the debtors for assembling their property and not concealing
anything. . . . It was thought to be a benefit to the creditors.").
19 See Hallinan, supra note 5, at 54-55 (discussing how "nineteenth century
state legislatures . . . enacted a rich variety of laws with the avowed purpose of
affording insolvent debtors some greater or lesser degree of release from the en-
forcement of creditors' claims").
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emerged.20 The decision to reward overburdened ebtors with
a fresh start is now about more than just maximizing creditor
returns in the face of an insolvent debtor; in the United States,
it is also about furthering socioeconomic, economic, and mor-
ally based policy objectives.
A. (Socio)Economic Policy Rationales
The (socio)economic rationales for offering individuals a
fresh start predate America's first set of bankruptcy laws.2 1
Arguing for the adoption of a national bankruptcy law in 1841,
President John Tyler bemoaned the mounting personal debt
loads causing "large numbers of our fellow citizens" to experi-
ence mental and physical anguish.22 He noted that this deflat-
ing anguish was sapping many Americans' productive energies,
making them less productive than they could have been, and
that a fresh start could help America become more
productive.23
Others shared in President Tyler's sentiment. Blackstone
wrote that a fresh start propels the debtor back into "a useful
member of the commonwealth."24 Justice Joseph Story argued
that without a fresh start, the debtor's industriousness is quel-
led because their future earnings are monopolized by credi-
tors.2 5 And Professor Mack added that society needs the fresh
start policy because society needs all of its members to be
productive.26 Expanding on President Tyler's argument, Pro-
fessor Mack also contended that if some of society's members
are demotivated because of excessive debt loads,2 7 then these
20 See infra subparts I.A., I.B. (discussing economic and policy-based
rationales).
21 See Hallinan, supra note 5, at 56-57.
22 Id. at 57 n.24 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1841)).
23 See id. For another example of how debt decreases the productivity of
individuals and makes society worse off, see GIUSEPPE PAPARELLA, PICKER INST.
EUROPE, DEBT AND HEALTH: A BRIEFING 1 (2015) (reporting that overburdened UK
debtors create real social and economic costs, upwards of 8.3 billion pounds, "due
to lost jobs, reduced productivity, costs of people losing their homes and for
people relying more on support services").
24 See Hallinan, supra note 5, at 57 n.24 (citing 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *484).
25 Id. (citing 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1101 (1833)).
26 Id. (citing Edwin S. Mack, Bankruptcy Legislation, 28 AM. L. REV. 1, 5
(1894)).
27 This Note does not presuppose that debt is inherently bad or unproductive,
only that certain types of debt are (i.e., a debt that would be so excessive as to
make an individual or entity unproductive or an odious debt). Historical accounts
expressed here are meant to highlight a shared sentiment that debt can be bad,
not that it is bad.
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members are not incentivized to contribute towards the na-
tion's improving productivity, which leaves society worse off. In
short, a fresh start helps improve society by making more of its
members productive.
From a narrower economic perspective, consider how the
fresh start implicates debtors' incentives. When individuals
are buried in debt, every penny they earn goes directly to their
creditors. Thus, debtors can become indifferent to their level of
income and decide not to seek-out more productive pursuits.28
This interferes with the profit-maximizing assumption of class-
ical economics and minimizes the positive externalities that
stem from having more productive workers in the economy2 9 -
as indicated by Taylor, Mack, and Blackstone.
Further, when debtors cannot take ownership in their live-
lihoods, we can expect them to make economically inefficient
decisions.3 0 For example, these individuals may pursue unrea-
sonably risky projects or investments, so as to regain their
solvency.3 1 Society could decide to (a) leave the debtor to their
own devices, allowing them to continue making risky bets at
their own peril, or (b) offer the debtor a remedy through bank-
ruptcy and the fresh start.32 American policymakers have de-
cided to pursue the latter route because, collectively, the
economic loss of forgiving some debt through an orderly bank-
ruptcy process is less than allowing the individual to wallow in
insolvency making ever riskier bets, and possibly getting into
even more debt along the way.3 3 A fresh start helps to mini-
28 See Georgakopoulos, supra note 9, at 51 ("The fresh start policy avoids the
destruction of individual productivity incentives.").
29 See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, But She Can Keep the Car?
Some Thoughts on Collateral Retention in Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, 7 FORDHAM
J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 471, 491 (2002) (noting that if the debtor's fresh start is
structured properly, "enabling [a worker] to become and remain a more productive
worker, then the benefits extend beyond the immediate parties to the economy as
a whole").
30 See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHi. L. REv. 425, 468




33 See generally id. at 468-69 ('We could allow individuals to remain in this
limbo, having little to no hope for ever extricating themselves from their financial
messes. . . . But we have chosen a different path. Perhaps we have run the
numbers and have concluded that the losses from a tough policy are exceeded by
the gains from a softer approach. Perhaps we believe that individuals do a poor
job of making decisions about low-probability events such as bankruptcy, and
that these cognitive biases require corrective action by the government.").
1648 [Vol. 104:1643
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mize the collective cost of insolvency. Therefore, it is a worth-
while economic policy.
Another argument for having a fresh start policy is that it
minimizes the cost of public welfare. The logic unfolds as fol-
lows. If an individual's incentive to produce is maintained,
then he will be less likely to seek out public welfare since the
individual will more likely be able and willing to support them-
selves.34 Also, and conversely, if a debtor cannot receive a
discharge and thereby loses their assets, then the debtor
"might rely instead on social welfare programs."3 5 Further, a
growing number of indigent debtors unable to receive a fresh
start means not only growing public welfare schemes, but then
also growing taxes to support it, which introduces an addi-
tional drain on society. The fresh start thus serves as a way to
minimize public welfare costs by increasing one's ability and
incentive to care for oneself.
A fresh start is also beneficial because it helps efficiently
allocate the default risk between debtors and creditors.3 6
Without a discharge and a fresh start, debtors would bear all of
the default risk; regardless of the debtors' circumstances, they
will always owe the creditor for any unpaid money under the
debt contract. Additionally, if debtors bear all of the downside
risk, creditors do not have as great an incentive to monitor
their credit-risk because they do not bear any of the downside
risk-they are always going to get repaid.3 7 Whereas, a fresh
start allows debtors and creditor to split this risk. If the risk is
split, then in bankruptcy debtors and their creditors split the
nonrepayment losses. Even still, some argue that since debtors
are in control of making their own financial decisions, they are
best able to manage the downside risk.3 8 However, this per-
34 See Byington, supra note 3, at 122 n.32 ("Without the discharge, a hope-
lessly insolvent debtor would lose her incentive to produce, preferring instead ...
administratively costly welfare benefits." (quoting Adam J. Hirsh, Inheritance and
Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the "Fresh Start," 45 HASTING L.J. 175, 207 (1994))).
3- Id. at 122 (quoting Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bank-
ruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1402 (1985)).
36 See id. at 123 ("Some have argued that the fresh start promotes efficient
allocation of risk of loss between the debtor and the creditor . . . ."); see also
Georgakopoulos, supra note 9, at 60-61 (arguing that a fresh start leads creditors
"to filter their debtors, i.e., to choose the more able and those who have better
prospects, and thus allocate society's scarce capital according to productivity").
37 See Georgakopoulos, supra note 9, at 61 ("The fresh start prevents lenders
from being satisfied from the debtor's future income.").
38 See Byington, supra note 3, at 123; id. at 123 n.37 (quoting Robert A.
Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99, 126
(1990)) (positing that "debtors are in control of their financial activities and there-
fore are arguably in a better position to predict and avoid financial collapse or to
2019] 1649
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spective ignores those debtors that are in financial peril be-
cause of some unforeseen misfortune, which is problematic
since the fresh start also exists to alleviate unforeseen
hardships."
Even still, some scholars and commentators argue that
robust fresh start policies are inappropriate because they
wreak havoc "on market behavior."4 0 This is because (1) an
overly broad fresh start policy can stifle productivity as debtors
may be less likely to pursue opportunities that generate posi-
tive externalities due to high interest rates; and (2) the positive
externalities from a debtor's fresh start do not necessarily out-
weigh the "direct ex ante costs borne by debtors" in the form of
higher interest rates.4 '
What these critics miss though, and what this Note tries to
highlight, is that the fresh start is about more than just eco-
nomic rationales alone or structuring a fresh start policy that
allows the market to perfectly price debt. The fresh start is also
about undergirding social and moral objectives. Additionally, it
is unlikely that all of these externalities could even be priced by
economic models alone. As Justice Sotomayor notes, "mar-
ket[s] do[ ] not price all externalities, the law does"4 2 -- which is
why the law must consider the social and moral justifications
for a fresh start policy as well the as economic ones.
B. Morality-Based Policy Rationales
Morality-based rationales for offering individuals a fresh
start also predate America's first set of bankruptcy laws.4 3 The
concept of a fresh start was originally endorsed as an extension
insure against it"); see also id. at n.37 (quoting A. Charlene Sullivan, Reply:
Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 WIS. L. REv. 1069, 1071) (arguing
that "risk of bankruptcy for an individual could be largely a function of personal
characteristics that creditors are not particularly adept at evaluating").
39 See generally infra Section C.
40 See WARREN ET AL., supra note 13, at 918 ("[Pjroceduralists are fundamen-
tally concerned with the effect of bankruptcy law on market behavior. For them,
one of the key mischiefs that substantive and redistributive policies wreak in
bankruptcy is distorting business incentives.").
41 See Barry E. Adler, The Soft-Landing Fallacy and Consumer Debtors, 7
FORDHAM J. CoRp. & FIN. L. 499, 500 (2002); see also WARREN ET AL., supra note 13,
at 918 ("The ultimate 'proceduralist' goal of bankruptcy is to lower the cost of
credit for debtors.").
42 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1437 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
43 See Hallinan, supra note 5, at 57 ("Building on a characterization of the
insolvent's default as a matter of misfortune rather than blameworthiness, [mor-
ally based rationales] focused on mercy or forbearance as the morally correct
response to financial failure and depicted collection efforts as a morally repugnant
effort to inflict suffering for greedy motives.").
1650 [Vol. 104:1643
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of Judeo-Christian values into debtor-creditor relations. Un-
dergirding this extension, Justice Story would later argue that
leaving debtors saddled with excessive debt burdens only to
serve at the behest of their creditors is "incompatible with the
first percepts of Christianity; and is a living reproach to the
nations of [C]hristendom."44
Some commentators even go so far as to say that debt
burdens are "chains of the soul,"4 5 noting, though, that when
society provides individuals with a fresh start it is akin to set-
ting an individual's soul free.4 6 Such unfastening is especially
warranted when those chains are the result of "misfortune
rather than blameworthiness."4 7 That is because when an in-
dividual has fallen on hard times through some misfortune,
society's morally upright reaction should be to show "mercy or
forbearance," not a desire to collect debts and cause suffering
only to further "greedy motives."4 8 Therefore, it is helpful to
have the fresh start inhibit creditors' "morally repugnant" incli-
nations to collect even in the face of the debtor's unwilled and
unforeseen misfortune.4 9
Additionally, the fresh start helps ensure that an individ-
ual's human dignity is preserved in times of financial dis-
tress.5 0 As mentioned above, not providing a fresh start can
create a situation where an individual is only producing for the
creditors' benefits. This devalues an individual's dignity since
their self-determination is tempered by their need to fill their
creditors' pockets. A fresh start rectifies this by putting the
individual "back on the road to self-determination."5 1 Therein,
freeing the debtor from oppressive debt loads restores "the
debtor's sense of self-worth."52 This is, in and of itself, a worthy
44 Id. at 57 n.25 (quoting STORY, supra note 25, at § 1101); see also Barry
Herman, Doing the Right Thing: Dealing with Developing Country Sovereign Debt,
32 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 773, 782 (2007) (tracing "the origin of the 'fresh
start' case for debt relief back to biblical calls for periodic household debt forgive-
ness in the 'Jubilee Years'").
45 See Hallinan, supra note 5, at 57 n.25 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 27th CONG.,
1st Sess. 318 (1841) (remarks of James Roosevelt)).
46 Id
47 Id. at 57.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for
Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 536
(1991) (describing Congress' "recognition that the intrinsic value of human dignity
dictates that a debtor be given an opportunity to earn a living").
51 Id.
52 Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral
Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 56, 95 (1990).
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societal objective because society benefits from promoting hu-
manitarian ideals that "makes us all better people."5 3
1. Debts Exempt from Discharge
Just as society has made debts dischargeable because al-
lowing a debtor to languish under an unbearable debt load is
repugnant, society has also decided it would be equally objec-
tionable to discharge debts that are themselves repugnant.5 4
Society has done this through Congressional action, which in-
cluded adopting a bankruptcy Code where some debts are ex-
empt from discharge and continue with the debtor into their
fresh start.5 5 Many of these debts are exempt because society
views that type of debt as repugnant.5 6 These debts are viewed
as such because society has determined that the behaviors
exhibited in obtaining the debts are abhorrent. And because
society does not want to reward such behavior, the Code does
not allow the debtor to discharge such repugnant debts.
For example, the Code exempts from discharge: (i) debts
acquired through various forms of fraud;5 7 (ii) debts incurred
as a result of the debtor's "willful and malicious" injurious
actions against another;5 8 (iii) unpaid domestic support obliga-
tions;5 9 (iv) fines or penalties payable to a governmental insti-
tution that arose more than three years before the petition was
filed;6 0 and (v) outstanding student loans.6 1
Nondischargeable (repugnant) debts can be partitioned
into three categories: (1) familial obligations; (2) debts owing to
governmental entities and entities providing educational oans;
and (3) debts resulting from unfair debtor conduct vis-a-vis
their creditors.6 2 The first exemption exists because providing
53 Id.
54 See generally Hallinan, supra note 5, at 138; see also Flint, supra note 50,
at 537 (describing that Congress' decision to exempt certain debts from discharge
exemplify a "moral dimension" to discharge laws).
55 See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012) (enumerated list of exceptions to discharge).
56 See generally Hallinan, supra note 5, at 138.
57 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012) (exempting debts incurred through false
pretenses or representation); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012) (exempting
debts incurred through (i) acting in a fraudulent manner while a fiduciary, (ii)
embezzling, or (iii) larceny).
58 See id. § 523(a)(6); see also § 523(a)(9) (exempting debts incurred from
driving while intoxicated and killing or injuring someone).
se See id. § 523(a)(5).
60 See Id. § 523(a)(7).
61 See id. § 523(a)(8) (notwithstanding, in exceptional circumstances the
debtor can have their student loans discharged if they prove that an undue
hardship would result without a discharge).
62 See Flint, supra note 50, at 539-41.
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for one's family is "beyond question"63 and a "universal senti-
ment."6 The second exemption exists for two reasons: (a) un-
paid taxes or fines continue into the fresh start because of the
sheer political power of the sovereign, little or no moral justifi-
cations exist for this exemption; and (b) educational obligations
remain because easily allowing discharge would "restrict the
availability of future funds," which is "commutatively un-
just."6 5 For the third exemption, the moral rationale for why
these debts are nondischargeable is a bit more obvious than
the others. In deciding to not allow the debtor to discharge
debts resulting from unfair debtor conduct,66 Congress deter-
mined that the debtor's abhorrent actions justified favoring the
creditor rather than rewarding the debtor with a discharge.6 7
Therefore, even though bankruptcy generally permits dis-
charge that is not always the case.
II
SOVEREIGN DEBT, INSOLVENCY, AND DEFAULT
A. What is Sovereign Debt?
Sovereign debt is debt taken out at the national level, not
the state or local level.6 8 It is usually obtained through issuing
bonds in national and international capital markets.6 9 The
bonds are usually unsecured and payable over a set number of
63 Id. at 539.
64 Id. at 539 n.102 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 57-1698, at 3 (1902)).
65 Id. at 540; see also id. at 540 n. 106 ("[s]tating that nondischargeability of
[student loans] was necessary because rising number of bankruptcies by students
who had such loans posed a 'threat to the continuance of educational loan pro-
grams.'") (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 177 (1973)); id. at 540 n.108 ("[An
individual who] abuses, exploits, or 'free-rides' on some system which is advanta-
geous to himself and to others, knowing that his abuse may bring about the
limitation or abandonment of the scheme. . ., is commutatively unjust to all those
who might in future have enjoyed the benefits of the original scheme." (quoting
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTS 184 (1980))). Relative to other ex-
empt debts, the student-loan exemption is an outlier because it is not a repugnant
debt in-and-of-itself like other debts exempt from discharge; instead, it is not
dischargeable because Congress is afraid that everyone will just start declaring
bankruptcy so that they can discharge their student loans.
66 These include "obligations which are founded in fraud, false financial
statements, willful torts, and breach of fiduciary duty, among others." Id. at 541;
see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (a)(6) (2012).
67 See Flint, supra note 50, at 541 n. 114.
68 Will Kenton, Sovereign Debt, INVESTOPEDIA (June 22, 2018), https://www
.investopedia.com/terms/s/sovereign-debt.asp [https://perma.cc/4KS8-YRTU];
see also Simon Johnson & James Kwak, National Debt for Beginners, NPR PLANET
MONEY (Feb. 4, 2009), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=
99927343 [https://perma.cc/W8GG-LNRS].
69 See Kenton, supra note 68.
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years.70 Sovereigns use this capital to, for example, invest in
education, infrastructure, military, and social programs.7 1
Sovereigns usually raise debt from both domestic and in-
ternational creditors.72 When a sovereign sells debt to foreign
creditors, the debt is typically denominated in a reserve cur-
rency (e.g., the dollar or pound).73 Issuing debt in nondomestic
currency effectively raises the cost of debt by adding an ex-
change-rate risk, but it often also allows the sovereign to raise
more money. Creditors to sovereign borrowers include both
domestic and international "banks, other financial corpora-
tions, hedge funds, pension funds, union funds, foreign and
municipal governments, and individual investors, to name a
few."74
Sovereign debt shares many similarities with debt instru-
ments common in other commercial and consumer contexts.
First, sovereign debt is usually unsecured. Unlike a mortgage
secured by a physical home or a corporate credit facility se-
cured by a company's inventory,7 5 sovereign debt is "more like
credit card debt or a college loan than like a mortgage."7 6 This
makes owning sovereign debt a riskier proposition.
Furthermore, the debt could be more akin to credit card
debt or a college loan depending on what the sovereign spends
the proceeds on. If the sovereign is investing in productive
ways, such as investing in education or infrastructure, then
the debt is closer to a college loan. Also like a college loan,
sovereign debt is similarly nondischargeable. Contrastingly, if
the sovereign spends new capital unproductively, to for exam-
ple clothe the nation's leader, then the debt is closer to credit
card debt.
70 See Johnson & Kwak, supra note 68 ("A bond is a promise to pay money in
the future; for example, a 10-year bond is a promise to pay a flat amount (the face
value) in 10 years, and a percentage of that flat amount each year until then.
When a government issues bonds, investors bid to buy those bonds, [which sets
the interest rate the government must pay]; the amount of money they pay is
therefore the amount that the government raises.").
71 See Luca Ventura, Percentage of Public Debt to GDP Around the World 2018,
GLOBAL FINANCE (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-
data/public-debt-percentage-gdp [https://perma.cc/X4C6-67NV].
72 See id.
73 Salim Furth, What Debt Crisis? A Default Primer for Governments, HERITAGE








Additionally, sovereign debt is similar to other types of debt
because it too is priced at an interest rate that represents the
risk/return trade-off to investors.7 7 When a bank decides to
lend, they must balance the probability of nonrepayment with
the interest rate required to justify lending. However, when
that same bank decides to lend to a sovereign, it must also
consider the additional risk that the sovereign might purpose-
fully inflate its currency to decrease its nominal debt load.7 8
This risk though is partially alleviated if sovereigns issue their
debt in reserve currencies, as reserve currencies' institutions
are less likely to manipulate their currencies, which allows
creditors to offer better terms.
Even with these nuances in mind, when the sovereign is
satisfying its obligations under the debt agreement heir debt is
indistinguishable from any other type of commercial or con-
sumer debt. However, when the sovereign defaults, the differ-
ences between sovereign debt and commercial or consumer
debt become starkly apparent. The next section highlights
these differences.
B. Sovereign Default and Recourse?
When a sovereign debtor defaults, it is saying that it cannot
or will not pay its contractual debt obligations.79 When a com-
pany or consumer defaults, they are saying the same thing.
However, what makes the sovereign default context different is
the lender's recourse options. A corporate lender can go to the
appropriate court, receive a judgment, a writ, and then levy
against the defaulting company's assets;8 0 or a consumer
lender can obtain garnishment on future income.8 1 But, if the
sovereign defaults, the lender's self-help and forced-collection
options are limited.
It is unlikely that the sovereign's lender would be able to do
either of the things corporate or consumer lenders can: levy on
the debtor's assets or garnish the debtor's future income.
77 Id.
78 Id. This is effectively nonrepayment under another guise.
79 Id. For example, Russian revolutionaries decided to simply repudiate all
old Tsarist debts in 1918. Eric Toussaint, The Russian Revolution, Debt Repudia-
tion, War and Peace, COMM. FOR THE ABOLITION OF ILLEGITIMATE DEBT (July 12, 2017),
https://cadtm.org/The-Russian-Revolution-Debt [https://perma.cc/YP4C-
TEWW].
80 See WARREN ET AL., supra note 13, at 40-41 (explaining the process secured
creditors go through to repossess assets).




These opportunities are foreclosed because (1) "few sovereign
assets (including future income streams) are located in foreign
jurisdictions, and a sovereign cannot credibly commit to hand
over assets within its borders in the event of a default"; and (2)
"there are legal principles [such as sovereign immunity] that
protect sovereign assets even when they are located in foreign
jurisdictions."8 2
However, the concept of sovereign immunity, which histor-
ically protected a sovereign's assets abroad, has eroded re-
cently. Under the old rules sovereigns needed to explicitly
waive their immunity, but now a court may hear any case
involving a sovereign as a party if the sovereign "suspend[s]
payments on debt contracts that call for payment in the United
States."3 Furthermore, when sovereign debtors raise money
they routinely agree to bond covenants that waive their right to
sovereign immunity. Thus, the defense of sovereign immunity
is not as harsh as it once was.84
And creditors are willing to utilize these newfound rights.
When Argentina defaulted on its debt, U.S.-based hedge fund
Elliott Management found some success litigating over repay-
ment in courts.8 5 The hedge fund first went to U.S. and U.K
courts to obtain judgments holding that it was entitled to pay-
ment on the defaulted debt it owned.8 6 Once it had these judg-
ments in hand, the hedge fund went to Ghana and seized an
Argentinian Navy Ship.87 In conjunction with other collection
tactics, this created enough pressure for the hedge fund and
82 Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics
and Law of Sovereign Debt and Defaul, 47 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 651, 653 (2009).
83 Id. at 653 (mapping out the changes in sovereign immunity law, which
began with "the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976, which allows
private parties to sue a foreign government in U.S. courts if the complaint relates
to commercial activity"). Courts have since decided that issuing foreign bonds in
the United States constitutes such commercial activity. Additionally, "[tihe
United Kingdom adopted similar legislation in 1978 and many other jurisdictions
have followed suit." Id. (citing Lee C. Buchheit, Sovereign Immunity, 7 BUS. L. REV.
63-64 (1986)); Lee C. Buchheit, The Sovereign Client, 48 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 527-40
(1995); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (6th ed. 2003)).
84 Cf id. at 653 (noting that the principle of sovereign immunity still makes it
difficult for creditors to collect once they obtain a judgment; attachment proceed-
ings are difficult to win because FISA exempts many foreign assets from
attachment).
85 See Joe Weisenthal, A Hedge Fund Has Physically Taken Control of a Ship







Argentina to ultimately agree to a $2.4 billion settlement on the
defaulted bonds.8
Even with that being said, it generally remains difficult for
most creditors to collect on defaulted sovereign debt. Most
creditors will not make the Machiavellian moves that a hedge
fund might to collect. And sovereign immunity still protects
most assets from attachment.8 9 Therefore, since creditors can-
not rely on a formal bankruptcy proceeding to get repaid, the
creditors face a binary choice: negotiate a settlement or
litigate.90
This binary that sovereign-debtor's creditors face is unlike
the choice commercial or consumer creditors face; sovereign's
creditors do not have the third option to work out repayment in
bankruptcy. There is no international bankruptcy institution
and a sovereign is unlikely to submit to another nation's bank-
ruptcy regime.9 1 Subsequently, a sovereign's creditors are
more limited in how they can collect (litigation or negotiation)
and in their abilities to successfully collect if they decide to
litigate and end up winning.
At first, litigation may seem like the more fruitful avenue to
recover because sovereign debtors cannot use the power of the
automatic stay to stay pending litigation like the debtor in
Chapter 7 or 13. Too, the sovereign cannot use the threat of
bankruptcy as leverage to get creditors to not file suit and
instead negotiate a settlement. Further, because the sovereign
debtor cannot use the bankruptcy laws as leverage vis-a-vis
creditors, the sovereign does not have the power to get dissi-
dent creditors to agree to a settlement plan,92 making settle-
ment all the more difficult and litigation all the more appealing.
88 See Renae Merle, How One Hedge Fund Made $2 Billion from Argentina's
Economic Collapse, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/business/wp/2016/03/29/how-one-hedge-fund-made-2-billion-
from-argentinas-economic-collapse/?noredirect=on&utm term=.20470969168e
[https://perma.cc/B8NX-KR6H] (The hedge fund bought the debt with a face
value of $617 million for $117 million. And, Argentina ultimately got the ship
back-even before they settled with the hedge fund.).
89 See supra note 85: see also Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible
Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2010/2, at 7
(Apr. 2010), https://unctad.org/en/Does/osgdp20102-en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JB62-8TUP] ("Typically, only property that is used for a commercial
purpose by the foreign state may be seized and even then certain types of property
(such as foreign central bank reserves) often enjoy special immunities." Once a
creditor has a judgment, they are going to have a hard time levying "against the
sovereign's property held abroad.")
90 See BUCHHEIT & GULATI, supra note 89, at 6-7.




Nonetheless in practice, given the complexities, cost, and un-
certainty of litigation, the sovereign's creditors generally do not
pursue litigation as their primary route to secure repayment.
9 3
So, although one may think creditors would be inclined to
litigate given the debtor's lack of leverage, they actually often
decide to negotiate instead. But negotiation is particularly dif-
ficult for the sovereign debtor because even if it is able to get
some creditors to agree to a settlement of claims, it is still faced
with the difficulty of settling all claims by all creditors, a collec-
tive action problem which the bankruptcy regime facilitates.
The bankruptcy regime does this largely by predetermining
those debts that are dischargeable and those that are not.
Therefore, the difficulties involved in negotiating and litigating
sovereign debt repayment are exacerbated by the fact that
there are no clear laws or rules on what sovereign debt is dis-
chargeable. This is something that this Note argues can
change; it can change by adopting the already existing odious
debt doctrine.9 4
1. Sovereign Debt Dischargeability
As evident above, a key advantage of bankruptcy and the
fresh start is the ability to discharge debt. Some commenta-
tors, however, argue that a sovereign debtor cannot discharge
debts; therefore, sovereign bankruptcy is pointless. They sub-
mit that a sovereign cannot have dischargeable debts in the
same way as a chapter 7 petitioner because a sovereign can
never liquidate.9 5 Yet, that would suggest that only Chapter 7
debtors can discharge debts, which is untrue, since debtors in
Chapter 11 and 13 can also discharge debts. Their debts are
discharged by virtue of the bankruptcy plan-debts that are
not paid-off during the life of the plan are discharged.9 6
Even then, one could argue that the difference between a
Chapter 7 proceeding and a Chapter 11 or 13 proceeding is
that all creditors are present to vote on the plan in the latter
93 Id.; see also infra subpart II.B (identifying the difficulty sovereigns' credi-
tors have at actually levying on sovereign assets. If they are abroad, the assets
might be immune from attachment, and if they are domestic, it is very unlikely
that a domestic court will allow a creditor to levy against state assets.).
94 The odious debt doctrine is not a formally adopted doctrine (i.e., within a
multilateral treaty), although it is a very popular doctrine among academics and
commentators concerned about mitigating nation-states' debt burdens. See
ODETIE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: POLITICS, REPUTATION, AND LEGITIMACY IN
MODERN FINANCE 4, 8, 65 (2014).
95 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts:
An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 938 (2004).
96 See Discharge in Bankruptcy, supra note 11.
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chapters. And because all creditors can vote on the plan, they
therefore collectively agree on what debt is ultimately dis-
charged. Thus, there is no creditor notice issue. Too, there is a
neutral arbiter, the bankruptcy judge, that approves the plan
for fairness. Conversely, the sovereign does not have this op-
tion because the sovereign is not presenting a bankruptcy plan
that is vetted by a bankruptcy judge and voted on by all credi-
tors; therefore, the sovereign cannot have dischargeable debts.
However, the issue with this argument is that it rests on
the assumption that bankruptcy law and a bankruptcy court
are necessary for dischargeable debts to exist. True, the bank-
ruptcy court is the institution that ensures that all relevant
parties receive notice9 7 and that vets the plan for fairness.9 8
And bankruptcy law provides ex ante notice about which debts
are dischargeable and which are not. Thus, without the bank-
ruptcy courts and law, creditors would not have notice about
which debts could be discharged, and therefore, could be
treated unfairly by the debtor and other creditors.
As this Note will show below, however, these tripartite con-
cerns, (i) ex ante notice about which debts are dischargeable,
(ii) ex post notice that debts may be discharged, and (iii) a
fairness assessment, can all be satisfied without a bankruptcy
court and law. They can be satisfied by adopting specific poli-
cies and institutions that together serve a similar purpose.9 9
III
THE FRESH START AS A POLICY OBJECTIVE
FOR SOVEREIGNS
"The absence of a fresh start for sovereign debtors can have a
particularly pernicious effect on economic and social
development."0 0
-Jeffrey D. Sachs
The policy justifications favoring a fresh start for private
debtors are just as persuasive when applied to sovereign debt-
ors. Many of the arguments outlined above about how the
fresh start alleviates economic and moral concerns for the indi-
vidual also apply to the sovereign. Beyond these, the sovereign
97 See 11 U.S.C. § 342 (2012) (providing that notice must be given to all
relevant parties).
98 See John A. Gilchrist, "Fair and Equitable" Plan of Reorganization: A
Clearer Concept, 26 CORNELL L. REv. 592, 592 (1941).
99 See generally infra subpart IV.C.
100 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Resolving the Debt Crisis of Low-Income Countries, 2002
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIvny 257, 260 (2002).
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faces additional macroconcerns that the individual does not.
Therefore, as this section will showcase, sovereign debtors face
even more economic and moral threats from excessive debt
burdens than individual debtors.
The popular practice when discussing sovereign debt re-
structuring is to analogize it to Chapter 11.101 While this anal-
ogy is productive and enlightening, it is not completely
inclusive of "how the principles of bankruptcy should translate
to the case of sovereign borrowers."10 2 This is because to aptly
and completely translate bankruptcy principles we must look
beyond Chapter 11 alone and include a more consumer-ori-
ented perspective of these bankruptcy principles. This includes
looking at the fresh start policy as conceptualized within the
consumer, noncorporate, bankruptcy context.
A. Economic Policy Rationales for a Sovereign Fresh Start
Policy
Many of the same microeconomic concerns that plague in-
dividuals burdened by heavy debt loads also plague sovereigns
burdened by heavy debt loads. Like an individual debtor, a
sovereign's productivity suffers under an onerous debt bur-
den.1 0 3 For example, when a sovereign is heavily indebted, tax
revenue that would be better spent on productive investments
in education or infrastructure will instead go to servicing the
sovereign's debt. As a result, the sovereign's productivity po-
tential is diminished as funds are spent on less productive
means, rather than more productive means. 104
Another concern that stems from a burgeoning sovereign
debt load is the lessening availability of public goods. In the
face of increasing debt payments, the sovereign may need to
101 See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel Jr., Inside the Black Box: How
Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured, 53 EMORY L.J. 763
(2004); Benjamin J. Cohen, A Global Chapter 11, 75 FOREIGN POL'Y 109 (1989);
Alice de Jonge, Returning to Fundamentals: Principles of International Law Appli-
cable to the Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises, 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 1,
16 n.57 (2013); Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy
Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 956 (2000); Ruben Sklar, Comment,
Renegotiation of External Debt: The Allied Bank Case and the Chapter 11 Analogy,
17 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 59 (1985).
102 Schwarcz, supra note 101, at 971 (quoting Jeffrey D. Sachs, Do We Need
an International Lender of Last Resort 8 (Apr. 20, 1995) (unpublished manu-
script), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d6d4/2cOeObbOl258e89cf3ef99e2dl
7434ac863e.pdf [https://perma.c/34TU-Q6PH]).
103 See Ant6nio Afonso & Jodo Tovar Jalles, Growth and Productivity: The Role
of Government Debt, 25 INT'L REV. ECON. & FIN. 384, 385, 393 (2013).
104 See ROBERT A. ISAAK, THE GLOBALIZATION GAP: How THE RICH GET RICHER AND
THE POOR GET LEFT FURTHER BEHIND 152-53 (2004).
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cut public goods, such as "health, police, and fire services," to
service its debt.105 Not only is this undesirable for individual
citizens, it is troublesome for macroeconomic-stability.106 In
the extreme, if citizens are not getting essential services from
their government they may be more inclined to overthrow their
government.10 7 This is bad from the citizens' perspectives as
they have to deal with the deleterious effects of instability and
bad from the creditors' perspectives since creditors are less
likely to get repaid in times of upheaval.
Outside of the more direct negative effects, sovereigns may
also have to contend with long-term social disadvantages, such
as a brain drain, if their debts become too large. When sover-
eign debt loads get too large, economies begin to falter.10 8 As
they do, debt loads become harder to contain, pushing the
sovereign deeper into crisis. 109 If debt burdens become too
hard to contain, drastic austerity measures may be taken.'10
These measures often have negative economic side effects, as
recently seen in Greece1 1' and Argentina.112 And one such
(long-term) negative effect, as Greece recently learned, is the
inauguration of a countrywide brain drain." 3
105 Id. at 153.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See Furth, supra note 73.
109 See id.
110 Id.; see also Mehreen Khan, Jim Brunsden & Kerin Hope, Debt Relief Deal
Gives Greece Hope After Years of Austerity, FIN. TIMES (June 22, 2018), https://
www.ft.com/content/bee7ec5a-7625-11e8-b326-75a27d27ea5f [https://perma
.cc/9ST5-AKLS] (explaining how after eight years of austerity, Greece is finally
moving beyond its previous sovereign debt default).
111 See Chris Baynes, Greece Bailout Programme Finally Comes to an End-
But Country Faces Decades of Austerity, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 19, 2018), https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/greece-eurozone-bailout-pro-
gramme-end-alexis-tsipras-euro-europe-debt-austerity-a8498501.html [https://
perma.cc/T3F2-TY5G] (showing that Greece has and will continue to face stark
austerity measures because of its default).
112 See Jerome Roos, Editorial, Argentina's IMF Bailout Rekindles Painful Mem-
ories of Past Crises, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/in-
depth/opinion/ argentinas-imf-bailout-rekindles-painful-memories-crises-
180907051253079.html [https://perma.ce/32Z6-DSCW (highlighting how once
again Argentina is facing negative economic effects from austerity measures im-
posed as a result of large debt loads before it has even recovered from the
2001-2002 default-induced economic crisis).
113 See VLAsios SARANTINOS, CTR. FOR EMP'T STUDIES RESEARCH, UNIV. OF W. ENG.,
BRISTOL, GREECE: THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE BRAIN DRAIN 1 (2012), http://
www2.uwe.ac.uk/faculties/BBS/BUS/Research/CESR/July_2012_Sarantinos
.pdf [https://perma.ce/3N6B-RWSK] (showcasing that the failure of Greek aus-
terity measures has led to a sustained economic crisis that "inaugurat[ed] . .. the
'Greek Brain Drain'"); see also Natasha Lycia Ora Bannan, Puerto Rico's Odious
Debt: The Economic Crisis of Colonialism, 19 CUNY L. REv. 287, 293-94 (2016)
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As noted, excessive levels of sovereign debt hinder produc-
tivity growth, in part because they "decreas[e] investment and
consumption resulting in less employment and lower output
growth." 1 4 Although economists seem to agree that some sov-
ereign debt is beneficial,115 there is debate over when exactly
sovereign debt goes from a productive to an unproductive
amount." 6  Whatever the threshold, economists agree that
when debt loads become too large economic growth does not
just slow, it grinds to a halt." 7
One of the reasons that productivity and economic growth
slow when debt burdens are too high is because in times of
financial strain, the debtor is likely not using their assets in the
most productive ways.118 Like the individual debtor in finan-
cial distress, the sovereign is also likely to use their assets in
less productive and riskier ways so as to try to pay off their
debts.1 1 When in a financial bind, sovereigns are more likely
(explaining how Puerto Rico's austerity measures have led citizens to leave the
country "to seek employment in the United States").
114 Afonso & Jalles, supra note 103, at 384.
115 See Paul Krugman, Opinion, Debt is Good, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/21/opinion/paul-krugman-debt-is-good-
for-the-economy. html [https://perma.cc/UPT5-78LN]; see also Christina
Checherita-Westphal & Philipp Rother, The Impact of High Government Debt on
Economic Growth and its Channels: An Empirical Investigation for the Euro Area,
56 EuR. ECON. REV. 1392, 1403 (2012) (finding that sovereign debt helps to facili-
tate long-term economic growth up to certain point).
116 See, e.g., Checherita-Westphal & Rother, supra note 115, at 1403 (con-
cluding that the relationship between sovereign debt and growth is concave,
which means that after a certain amount of debt (around 90/o-100%), long-term
growth rates begin to slow and decrease as new debt is accumulated); see also
Anna Gelpem, Bankruptcy Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121
YALE L.J. 888, 926 (2012) ("[Tihere exists a theoretical point of overin-
debtedness. . .
117 See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt,
100 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 573, 577 (2010) (examining "the experience of
44 countries spanning up two centuries" and finding "that across both advanced
countries and emerging markets, high debt/GDP level (90 percent and above) are
associated with notably lower growth outcomes"). Slowing economic growth is not
bad just because the country is not growing wealthier at a consistent rate, but
also because it slows technological and medical progress, which hurts a country's
citizens. See Emily F. Mancina, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resur-
recting the Odious Debt Doctrine in International Law, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
1239, 1240 (2004) (highlighting a 1989 UNICEF report that showed a correlation
between high developing country debt loads and rising child mortality rates).
118 See Brad Setser, The Political Economy of the SDRM, in OVERCOMING DEVEL-
OPING COuNTRY DEBT CRISIS 317, 323 (Barry Herman, Jose Antonio Ocampo &
Shari Spiegel eds., 2010) (noting that "a fresh start would allow resources that
would otherwise go to debt service to be redirected toward social and growth-
enhancing expenditures").
119 See Stephen J. Choi et al., Political Risk and Sovereign Debt Contracts 14




to use state assets in risker ways so as to lower their chances of
default. Like in the consumer context, incorporating a fresh
start into sovereign restructuring could help alleviate the con-
cern that assets will be used in risker ways.
Additionally, a fresh start is a necessary component of any
effective sovereign restructuring regime because without it
there are "large negative-sum games."120 That is, creditors
with divergent interests are fighting each other and the debtor
for whatever repayment they can gain, and the debtor becomes
occupied fighting off numerous collection attempts instead of
trying to recover from financial instability. This avoidable in-
fighting leads to "large negative-sum games" played by credi-
tors and the debtor.12 1 Here, a cost that the bankruptcy regime
avoids is instead paid for by society. This showcases how,
when collective societal costs are not considered in determining
whether to incorporate a fresh start, society ends up paying the
ultimate price. 122
Moreover, the credit risk allocation concerns mentioned
above in the personal debtor context continue to apply in the
sovereign debtor context. When creditors do not share the
downside risk with debtors, they are less likely to monitor their
credit exposure as it relates to this debt and debts of this
type.12 3 The same outcome is true when creditors do not share
andeconomics [https://perma.cc/99EE-YJGC] (arguing that there is a risk that
"[sovereign] debtors can take on more debt and invest it in risky projects with the
expectation that they will receive the benefits if [a] good [outcome] occurs and will
share the losses with foreign creditors if [a] bad [outcome] occurs").
120 See Martin Guzman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Creating a Framework for Sover-
eign Debt Restructuring That Works, in Too LITILE, Too LATE, supra note 1, at 3.
121 See id. at 3-4 (discussing fresh starts and comprehensive bankruptcy laws
as protecting both creditors and debtors from the "chaos" of having to fight each
other for dividends); Positive-Sum Game, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www
.britannica.com/topic/positive-sum-game#ref189339 [https://perma.cc/J4E4-
59Q2] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) ("The term negative-sum game describes situa-
tions in which the total of gains and losses is less than zero, and the only way for
one party to maintain the status quo is to take something from another party.").
122 See also supra subpart L.A (explaining how without a fresh start the indi-
vidual debtor is forced to rely on welfare for subsistence with society paying the
ultimate price-a price that could have been avoided). Likewise, when the sover-
eign does not have a fresh start, a price that could have been avoided exists and
society again pays the price.
123 This is particularly troublesome since it introduces additional systemic
strain on the financial system. when credit risk is wholly or largely transferred
away from creditors, the outcome is additional systemic risk. See Luigi Spaventa,
Subprime Crisis and Credit Risk Transfer: Something Amiss, Vox CEPR POL'Y POR-
TAL (Sept. 6, 2007), https://voxeu.org/article/subprime-crisis-and-credit-risk-
transfer-something-amiss 1https://perma.cc/J4HR-3DYM (highlighting that
transferring credit risk away from creditors (the banks) to a counterparty (the
market) was a contributing factor to the recent subprime mortgage crisis) ("[The
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the downside risk with the sovereign debtor-the creditors are
less likely to monitor their assumed risks. This is particularly
troublesome here because in distressing times it is harder for
creditors to collect from sovereign debtors than individual debt-
ors.12 4 Therefore, by initiating a fresh start policy in the sover-
eign context, credit-risk would be allocated more efficiently
between the creditor and the debtor nation. 1 2 5 This is some-
thing that is good for continued macroeconomic stability.
B. Morality-Based Policy Rationales for a Sovereign Fresh
Start Policy
As with the socioeconomic rationales, the morality-based
rationales for providing a fresh start to private debtors are also
applicable to sovereign debtors. This section will highlight the
morality-based policy reasons for why a sovereign should be
eligible for a fresh start.
Sovereigns, like private debtors, could feel hopelessly in-
debted. In such situations, the morally upright reaction may
be to free (at least in part) the sovereign from those debts. In an
international community of sovereigns, when one sovereign is
depressed by ravaging debts, others could benefit from dis-
charging debts because "the promotion of humanitarian values
. . . 'makes us all better [sovereigns]."'1 2 6 In an increasingly
interconnected world, sovereigns are the trustees of our global-
ized humanity and their sustainability should be considered
since our national and individual interests are connected to the
interests of other nations.12 7
Additionally, the Judeo-Christian rationale for providing a
sovereign with a fresh start follows the same rationale as ap-
plied to individual debtors.12 8 Those espousing this philosophy
argue that overburdening sovereigns with debt is akin to a
notion that] distribution [of credit risk] to non-bank players. . .would alleviate the
systemic consequences ... is not what has happened.").
124 See Christian Kersting, Combating the Financial Crisis: European and Ger-
man Corporate and Securities Laws and the Case for Abolishing Sovereign Debtors'
Privileges. 48 TEX. INT'L L.J. 269, 313 (2013).
125 See Georgakopoulos, supra note 9, at 61 (arguing for the introduction of a
fresh start policy because it "motivates creditors to help the debtor, to innovate in
the methods of reviewing their debtor's performance, and to refine the contractual
provisions of loans. All these effects lead to ever more increased productivity.").
126 See Tabb, supra note 52, at 95 (applying the rationale used to argue for
forgiving individual debts to argue for forgiving sovereign debts).
127 See Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accounta-
bility of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 295-97 (2013).
128 See Gelpern, supra note 116, at 928 (highlighting how the fresh start policy
applied to sovereigns comes from the Jubilee movement, which invokes the bibli-
cal concept of "Jubilee" in advocating for the abolishment of excessive debt loads).
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"form[ ] of slavery which [is] new and more subtle than those of
the past[.]"' 29 The debt loads allow rich nations to dominate
poorer nations, which is not only an "abuse of power [but also
a] denial of human dignity."13 0 The introduction of a fresh start
would serve to remedy this indignity by freeing the sovereign
from unduly serving its creditors' interests.
1. International Law and Sovereign Debt
Parts of the international community also support the no-
tion that excessive debt burdens are an affront to human dig-
nity, and thus an "obstacle . . . [to] the realization of human
rights."' 3 High debt loads necessitate high service payments,
which stymie a sovereign's ability to provide "human rights-
related public services."13 2 Further, human rights are
squashed because excessive sovereign debt burdens lead to
decreased food security, increased inequality, and increased
poverty levels.133
This failing arguably conflicts with Article 28 of the UN's
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 3 4 The Article pro-
vides that, "[elveryone is entitled to a social and international
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Decla-
ration can be fully realized."'3 5 A sovereign servicing its exces-
sive debt burden instead of providing human rights-related
public services is "inconsistent with this entitlement."'3 6 And
some argue that the sovereign-debtor and its creditors (and
129 See id. (quoting Pope John Paul II, Incarnationts Mysterium- Bull of Indica-
tion of the Great Jubilee of the Year 2000, § 12 (1998). http://www.vatican.va/
jubilee_2000/docs/documents/hf_jp-iidoc3011 998_bolla-jubileeen.html
(https://perma.cc/Z2Q2-ZG9C]).
130 Id.; see also generally JOHN PERKINS, CONFESSIONS OF AN EcONOMIC HIT MAN
(2004) (arguing that richer nations continue to loan money to developing nations
through development loans that end up stifling developing nations both politically
and economically).
131 See Cephas Lumina (Special Rapporteur on the Effects of Foreign Debt and
Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment
of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), Rep. on
Promotion and Protection ofAll Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 11/ 10, T1 24
(Apr. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Human Rights Report].
132 See id. The UN has declared that all persons have a human right to certain
public services such as education and health care. See U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
183d plen. mtg. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 25.1 (asserting that
"[e]veryone has the right to ... medical care and necessary social services"), art.
26.1 (asserting that "[e]veryone has the right to education").
133 See Human Rights Report, supra note 131, 9[ 28, 30.





thereby the creditors' sovereigns as the Declaration's signato-
ries) are violating international customary law by allowing
creditors to be paid rather than citizens served.1 3 7
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights requires that
human rights-related public services are provided, and these
Declaration provisions are "incorporated into customary inter-
national law, which is binding on all states."13 8 Thus, a sover-
eign servicing its debt in lieu of providing public services could
be a violation of international customary law. In order to rem-
edy this violation, creditors and sovereign debtors should agree
to a fresh start policy that works to discharge specific debts,
lower service payments, and increase human rights-related
public services.
In addition, letting sovereigns languish under excessive
debt burdens without offering them a fresh start is likely a
violation of international treaties. The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights requires that each
State take steps to internationally coordinate so as to realize all
citizens' inherent human rights.1 3 9 This requirement extends
to human rights violations related to debt crises and attempts
at debt relief. 140 If debt crises are consistently inhibiting sover-
eigns from providing human rights-related services, the lack of
international community coordination is likely a violation of
this treaty. This is not to say that the international community
is not working to solve the humanitarian toll of debt crises,14 1
137 For example, Natasha Lycia Ora Bannan argues that actions like austerity
measures "amount to economic violence and have resulted in the forced migration
of hundreds of thousands of people, cuts to critical public services . . . reduced
employment, and threats to remove federal labor protections." Bannan, supra
note 113, at 307. It is this "erosion of economic and social rights" that arguably
violate customary international law. See id.
138 Hurst Hannum, The UDHR in National and International Law, 3 HEALTH &
HUM. RTS. 144, 145 (1998).
139 See Human Rights Report, supra note 131, ¶ 53.
140 Id. ¶'lf 33 ("The various human rights treaty bodies have also noted ... that
excessive debt burdens pose a significant challenge to the realization of human
rights by undermining the human rights obligations of States . . . ."), 56
("[Ilnternational measures to deal with the debt crisis should take full account of
the need to protect economic, social and cultural rights through, inter alia, inter-
national cooperation.").
141 See, e.g., Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative, WORLD BANK (Jan.
9, 2018), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/hipc [https://perma
.cc/3SDU-9FRQ] (discussing the HIPC international debt relief Initiative, which
was "designed to ensure that the poorest countries are not overwhelmed by un-
manageable or unsustainable debt burdens"); cf. Human Rights Report, supra
note 131, ¶¶ 18-19 (arguing that the international community's responses to debt
crises, including the HIPC Initiative response, have been inadequate).
1666 [Vol. 104:1643
2019] SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1667
but adopting a fresh start policy for sovereigns faced with odi-
ous debt is another step in that right direction.
IV
THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE
Unlike private debtors, sovereigns are capable of incurring
and being liable for "odious" debts. Odious debts are debts
"contracted and spent against the interests of the population of
a State, without its consent, and with full awareness of the
creditor."1 4 2 Private debtors are unlikely to have odious debts
because an individual does "not have to repay money that
others fraudulently borrow in their name. Similarly, a corpora-
tion is not liable for[, for example,] contracts that the chief
executive officer enters without the authority to bind the
firm." 143 This is not the case with sovereigns, where citizens,
especially taxpayers, remain on the hook for odious debts in-
curred by prior regimes. 14
As this odious debt definition suggests, odious debts usu-
ally arise when (i) a sovereign is run by an exploitative regime
that uses debt to fulfill the idiosyncratic pursuits of the ruling
elite; and (ii) the debt is not used to further the interests of the
sovereign's citizenry.145 But this definition gets muddied be-
cause some (usually creditors) argue that for odious debt to
exist, the "creditors must have been aware of these conditions
142 Robert Howse, The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2007/4, at 2 (July 2007), https://unctad.org/en/docs/
osgdp20074_en.pdf [https://perma.ce/QXR8-RA5A]; see also NEW ECONOMICS
FOUNDATION, ODIOUS LENDING: DEBT RELIEF AS IF MORALS MATTERED 10 (2005), https:/
/neweconomics.org/uploads/ffiles/ff4a8929678dfec38 e5m6bdjp4.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7FJC-VFYV] (elaborating on Sack's odious debt definition and noting,
for example, that a "lack of consent exists whenever there is no real democracy
(either because power has been taken by force or because of serious electoral
fraud but not necessarily because of a one-party state if the constitution was
openly approved in a democratic manner)"); Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati, &
Robert B. Thomson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1203
(2007) (highlighting that the concept of odiousness has changed from a particular
debt being labeled odious to a regime being labeled odious, by which all of the
regime's debts are in turn odious).
143 Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt: When Dictators Bor-
row, Who Repays the Loan?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 2003), https://www.brookings
.edu/articles/odious-debt-when-dictators-borrow-who-repays-the-loan/ [https:/
/perma.cc/NF7F-Y953].
144 See id. (noting that "international law does not exempt citizens of a dicta-
torship from repaying a debt incurred by a dictator for personal and nefarious
purposes").
145 See NEW ECONOMICS FOUNDATION, supra note 142, at 10 (taking Sack's defi-
nition and making it more specific); see also Buchheit et al., supra note 142, at
1203 (defining odious debts as "debts incurred by a despotic regime that do not
benefit the people bound to repay the loans").
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when they issued the loans."1 4 6 Otherwise, the creditors would
not have either (a) ex ante notice about which debts are dis-
chargeable, or (b) ex post notice that debts may be dis-
charged.14 7 Therefore, creditors argue that it is unfair for
odious debts to be discharged since creditors do not have either
type of notice.
Scholars, practitioners, and religious figures argue that a
sovereign's odious debt should not always have to be repaid. 148
In other words, sovereigns should be able to discharge odious
debt. This would augment current creditor-sovereign-debtor
relations since successive governments are currently required
to pay the legacy debts of previous regimes, odious or not.149
However, as will become evident below, the already existing
odious debt doctrine supports, on moral, economic, and legal
grounds, the notion that successive governments should not
have to repay odious debts.
A. The Odious Debt Doctrine as a Moral Obligation
Section III spotlighted the reasons why a sovereign debtor
should be provided with a fresh start. First, the section fo-
cused on the shared economic and moral justifications for hav-
ing a fresh start policy. Then, the section expanded these
rationales to include justifications specific to sovereign debt-
ors. The moral, economic, and legal justifications apply to any
sovereign facing insolvency. However, when the sovereign
faces insolvency because of the fiscally irresponsible actions of
a prior illegitimate regime, these moral, economic, and legal
arguments are even more persuasive.
The notion of odious debts received significant attention
beginning in the late 1990s, with the rise of the Jubilee Move-
ment. o5 0 The movement focused on forgiving developing coun-
try debt that was used in wasteful ways and without citizens'
consent. 15' Leaders of the Jubilee Movement argued that ab-
sent citizens consenting or citizens benefiting from the debt, it
146 See Kremer & Jayachandran, supra note 143.
147 See supra section II.B.1 (explaining how the U.S. bankruptcy code and
courts provide creditors with this type of notice).
148 See Martha Minow, Forgiveness, Law, and Justice, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1615,
1641 (2015).
149 See id. ("ITihe usual rule [is] that agreements must be kept even when the
government incurring a debt has been overturned and replaced . . . ."); see also
Howse, supra note 142, at 4 (highlighting the existence of an "international legal
obligation to repay state-to-state debts").




is morally bankrupt to hold them liable for it as taxpayers of
the sovereign. Further, it is pointless to repay odious debts
because it punishes citizens for bad leadership while creditors
are not dissuaded from continuing to offer odious debt.15 2
In particular, odious debt should not be repaid because it
is morally repugnant o require citizens to repay debts incurred
without their consent and only for the benefit of an illegitimate
regime.15 3 Additionally, creditors should take a haircut on
such debt because the illegitimate actions of the prior regime
were "presumably visible to [the] lender" when it lent money;
therefore, the lender is also morally culpable and deserves not
to be repaid by the incoming administration.15 4 When "the evil
[regime] is vanquished," the morally right outcome is "all of the
baneful effects of that evil should automatically dissipate."5 5
But for it to actually dissipate, odious debt must be discharged.
1. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code and Odious Debt
The Code evidences, albeit implicitly, discrete choices
about whether to discharge certain types of repugnant debts to
the benefit of debtors or creditors. If it would be repugnant for
the debtor to wallow under the weight of excessive debt, then
the debt is dischargeable.5 6 Or, if it would be repugnant for
the debtor to have to liquidate certain assets to repay creditors,
then the asset is exempt from liquidation.'5 7 And, if it would be
152 See Minow, supra note 148, at 1641.
153 See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Odious Debts and Nation-Building:
When the Incubus Departs, 60 ME. L. REV. 477, 479-80 (2008) (highlighting that
"[t]his is a situation in which a strict requirement of the law (that governments
automatically succeed to, and must honor, the debt obligations of their predeces-
sors) is incongruent with most people's sense of the morally right outcome").
154 Id. at 480.
155 Id. at 481.
156 An example of this balancing is the Code's "Means Test," which is used to
determine the point at which a debtor is too overburdened by debt and deserves a
discharge in liquidation. This is to say that U.S. policymakers have devised a test
for the courts to use to determine whether it is better to have the debtor or the
creditor carry the debt burden (either debtor repayment or creditor write-off) post-
bankruptcy. If the debtor makes too much money and it seems that they are
using the bankruptcy laws to unjustly eliminate their debt, then the Means Test
does not allow the debtor to discharge their debts in Chapter 7 because doing so
would be unjust (morally repugnant) to the creditor. Such is but one example of
how the Code implicitly makes equitable judgments about who should ultimately
be responsible for the debt. To see how the Means Test operates, see generally 11
U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012).
157 See In re Victoria and Marcos Medina, No. 17 B 18090, Memorandum
Opinion on Trustee's Objection to Debtor's Claim of Exemptions at 8 (Bankr. N.D.
III. Nov. 20, 2017), https: //www.ilnb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/
MedinaVictoriaMarcos.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8WS-4R4Z] (holding that a wed-
ding ring was exempt property under Illinois law and thus that the debtor did not
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abhorrent to discharge a debt assumed via repugnant actions,
then the debt is not dischargeable.15 8 In each of these situa-
tions, the Code makes the decision to award a discharge or not
using an implicit balancing test.
The same analysis, applied to the odious debt context, sim-
ilarly supports a finding that certain types of debts are more
deserving of discharge than others. Whether an odious debt
should be dischargeable thus comes down to where the repug-
nancy threshold is exceeded. For example, if the sovereign
debtor is languishing under excessive debt, especially odious
debt, then it is repugnant to let the sovereign languish under
debt loads to which it did not consent and from which it does
not benefit. When the sovereign would have to cease providing
human rights-related services or liquidate important state as-
sets to repay creditors for odious debt, then the odious debt
should be discharged instead. And creditors should bear the
cost of this discharge because they either should have known
about the odious nature of the debt or they did know about the
odious nature of the debt when they lent money.
It is true that the above argument could apply to all sover-
eign debt. However, given that odious debt is inherently repug-
nant (i.e., it was not consented to by the sovereign's citizens
nor used for their benefit) in a way that other sovereign debt is
not, any such balancing test is much easier to perform. Since
this is the case, odious debt should have at least a presumption
of dischargeability in sovereign debt restructurings.
B. The Odious Debt Doctrine as an Economic and Legal
Obligation
The legal and economic arguments for discharging odious
sovereign debts go hand-in-hand. First, if providing credit to
repressive regimes elongates their tenures and if repressive
regimes stymie productivity and economic growth, then we are
supporting an international system where productivity and ec-
onomic growth is not maximized. This is obviously a negative
outcome. Instead, the "[1]egal embrace of the odious debt doc-
have to sell it to pay creditors). This case is another example of how the court and
the code balances equity considerations to determine whether it is less morally
repugnant if the debtor or the creditor ultimately bears the debt burden, since
whichever is less subsequently bears the burden.
158 See supra subsection I.B. 1 (highlighting that certain debts are exempt from
discharge because the debtor's actions in acquiring certain debt evidenced mor-
ally repugnant actions (e.g., debt acquired through fraud)).
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trine could redirect international capital to better uses" and
growth could be maximized, or at least increased.15 9
Further, the legal concept of unjust enrichment helps clar-
ify the illegitimacy of odious debt.16 0 When an illegitimate head
of state confers a benefit to creditors without its citizens receiv-
ing a benefit, the creditors have arguably been unjustly en-
riched.16 1 Therefore, the creditor should have to absorb the
losses or repay the sovereign's losses. This legal concept does
not have to be rigidly applied. Instead, it could be wielded
creatively to partition odious debts from non-odious debts, vali-
dating parts of the debt that were used to benefit citizens and
invalidating those that were not.16 2
Beyond the legal concept of unjust enrichment, agency law
also explicates the illegitimacy of odious debt. Implicit in the
odious debt definition is the lack of an agency relationship
between the principal (the citizens) and the agent (the govern-
ment).163 Per agency law, unless the principal consents to the
agent's representation, the agent cannot bind the principal.16 4
Thus, a dictator or other regime that comes to power without
citizens' consent cannot rightfully make decisions that bind
those citizens.'6 5 Like individuals and corporations who are
not liable for actions of unauthorized agents, sovereigns simi-
larly should not be liable for actions, including entering into
debt contracts, by an unauthorized agent (the illegitimate
regime).
159 Minow, supra note 148, at 1641 (citing LIENAU, supra note 94, at 98).
160 See id. at 1642.
161 See LEGAL INFO. INST., Unjust Enrichment, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/unjust-enrichment (https://perma.cc/4XRH-TEVG] (defining unjust enrich-
ment). Obviously, this hypothetical head of state has also been unjustly enriched,
but for present purposes we can assume that citizens will be unable to recover
from this head of state and will, instead, focus on trying to recover from the
creditor.
162 Buchheit et al., supra note 142, at 1235. Of course, this still leaves open
the major question about which courts would have the necessary jurisdiction to
make this determination.
163 See, e.g., id. at 1237-38 (discussing the relationship between citizens and
the government as an agent/principal relationship and supporting this character-
ization with reference to foundational texts in American political philosophy and
legal theory).
164 See Deborah A. DeMott, Agency by Analogy: A Comment on Odious Debt,
70 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 157, 163-64 (2007). Professor DeMott also points out
the difficulty in determining who exactly the principal is (e.g., the citizens, the
government, or the state itself), see id. at 160-61, but for this Note's purposes, it is
assumed that the citizens are the principal.
165 See generally Buchheit et al., supra note 142, at 1237-45 (exploring in-
depth how agency law leads to the conclusion that despotic governments (as




This Note contends that not adopting something like the
odious debt doctrine is an affront to human dignity because
creditors are permitted to force people (here, citizens) to pay for
something from which they did not benefit and to which they
did not consent. This goes against prevailing laws and princi-
ples including, inter alia, agency and unjust enrichment princi-
ples that are found within many domestic and international
laws.16 6 Therefore, the international community should adopt
the odious debt doctrine because (1) it would help resolve the
conflict between odious debt repayment and prevailing interna-
tional laws and principles; and (2) it would remedy the negative
economic effects of odious debt repayment, which in practice
limits human rights-related services and in turn harms
citizens. 167
Furthermore, while the justifications for a fresh policy ex-
amined above apply to sovereign debt generally, the argument
here is admittedly only advocating for discharging odious debt.
This is a conscious position and is chosen for pragmatic rea-
sons. First, pursuing a fresh start policy for sovereign-debtors
generally has been stalled for years. Second, there are even
more reasons for discharging odious debt. And third, it is a
conservative recommendation, as only a very small amount of
sovereign debt would be labelled odious.16
C. A Possible Solution Supported by a Fresh Start Policy
The odious debt doctrine has been actively debated among
scholars and practitioners "in recent years," with interest re-
newed after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.1
6 9 Its
usefulness wanes when questions about how to practically
solve the odious debt problem arise. Even still, discharging
166 See Christina Binder & Christoph Schreuer, Unjust Enrichment, OXFORD
PUB. INT'L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/
law-9780199231690-elOO2 [https://perma.cc/D9F7-MZRQ] (last visited Feb.
24, 2019) (revealing how unjust enrichment is both a general principle of law
within domestic laws and international law); Dieter Martiny, Hague Conventions
on Private International Law and on International Civil Procedure, OXFORD PUB.
INT'L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e942?rskey=hCiOm9&result=1&prd=OPIL [https://perma.ce/
P5B7-TSEK] (last visited Feb. 24, 2019) (spotlighting that agency law was interna-
tionalized, in part, by The 1978 Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency).
167 See Mancina, supra note 117, at 1240.
168 See LIENAU, supra note 94, at 9 (observing that "[wlere the doctrine [of
odious debt] to be adopted more broadly, it is likely that most sovereign debt
incurred in the contemporary era would still be binding most of the time").
169 See Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the




odious debt is an attainable outcome because odious debt is
narrowly defined. It is only debt lent by creditors, who had
notice of a regime's odiousness, and used by the sovereign
outside of the citizens' benefit. This Note argues that the solu-
tion proposed by Kramer and Jayachandran (the Authors) com-
ports with the existing odious debt doctrine and can be
supported and refined by the fresh start policy and the Code.
The Authors argue for "establishing an independent insti-
tution" with a mandate to assess regime legitimacy.170 Any
debt incurred subsequent to a regime being deemed illegitimate
would be odious.1 7 1 If a debt is deemed odious, then suc-
ceeding governments are not obligated to repay the debt. 17 2
Regimes labelled odious are therefore unlikely to receive addi-
tional creditor funds "since [creditors] would know that succes-
sor governments would have little incentive to repay them." 7 3
This would lead to a new sovereign-debt-market equilibrium
wherein a sovereign's reputation as a debtor will not suffer due
to nonrepayment of odious debts. 1 7 4
Additionally, in order to ensure parties (all major creditor
nations and debtors) coordinate, the Authors suggest estab-
lishing two enforcement mechanisms.17 5 First, countries shall
change their laws to "disallow seizure of a country's assets for
non-repayment of odious debt."1 76 Second, countries shall
make "foreign aid to successor egimes . .. contingent on non-
repayment of odious debt."17 7
The Authors' proposal shares many similarities with the
U.S. bankruptcy court and laws. As noted above, the Code is
concerned about creditor notice. In particular, three concerns
are central: the creditor should have (i) ex ante notice about
which debts are dischargeable; (ii) ex post notice that debts
may be discharged; and (iii) a fairness assessment. The Au-
thors' proposals would solve these tripartite concerns.
170 MICHAEL KREMER & SEEMA JAYACHANDRAN, BROOKINGS INST., POLICY BRIEF
#103: ODiOus DEBT 3 (2002), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/pblO3.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2PX-368L]. For further explanation on
how this institution could be implemented, see id. at 7-8.
171 See id. at 3-4.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 4.
174 Id. The theory that this would create a new market equilibrium is based on
"well-known result[s] in game theory." Id.; see id. at 2 (describing how South
Africa decided to repay odious debt because it was afraid that not doing so would
hurt its reputation in international capital markets-something that the new
equilibrium would help insure against).





First, the presence of the proposed institution puts credi-
tors on notice that as a general matter odious debt is dis-
chargeable.178 Second, given that only debt incurred after a
regime is labeled illegitimate is odious, creditors have notice at
the time of the labelling that the debts they subsequently fund
may be discharged. Lastly, the proposed institution will act as
a neutral arbiter, only declaring a regime illegitimate according,
presumably, to well-defined international norms and laws.
That is, a neutral, authorized third-party, like the judge in
bankruptcy court, will perform a fairness assessment to deter-
mine whether to deem a regime illegitimate and its future debts
odious. Therefore, the tripartite concerns noted above are sat-
isfied by the Authors' proposed institution's structure and
practices.
While the United States already makes it exceedingly diffi-
cult to attach to a sovereign's property abroad, the Authors'
solution would make it even harder. Instead of a sovereign
nevertheless having to deal with, for example, a hedge fund
successfully levying against its assets abroad for the nonpay-
ment of odious debt, the suggested enacting legislation would
negate that possibility entirely.17 9 In fact, these suggested en-
forcement mechanisms are similar to the Code's discharge in-
junction. Like the discharge injunction in bankruptcy, which
makes it impermissible for creditors to collect on discharged
debt, 180 these enforcement mechanisms are the functional
equivalent-they make it impermissible for creditors to collect
on odious debt, which would be presumptively discharged.
Although the Authors' proposed solution is novel, there are
still some potential blind spots that can be filled in from the
Code's existing concepts. The proposed solution provides the
illegitimate government's successor with a discharge of odious
debts. The idea being that a respectable government should
not have to bear the debt burdens of a repugnant government.
However, what happens if the successive regime is also repug-
nant? Does the successive (also repugnant) government re-
178 Some creditors would argue that it is unfair that they suffer the conse-
quences of regimes being labeled illegitimate when they do not have the ability to
decipher which regimes are or are not legitimate a priori. Even if we accept his as
true, this concern about creditor notice is irrelevant because the Authors' pro-
posed solution only qualifies debt as odious if it is provided after a regime is
labeled illegitimate. Therefore, a creditor does not need to be able to decipher a
legitimate regime from an illegitimate regime.
179 Of course, this is assuming that the hedge-fund is levying on an asset to
collect on an odious debt.
18O See supra note 14 (explaining what a discharge injunction is).
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ceive the odious debt discharge? Or does the successive
government have to be respectable under the eyes of the insti-
tution to receive the discharge? Or is just being less repugnant
than the last regime sufficient to receive the odious debt
discharge?'8 '
Moreover, the definition of odious debt, which the Authors'
proposed solution is based around, assumes that the debt is
not used to benefit citizens. However, if the proposed institu-
tion deems a government illegitimate, and that government
then receives creditor funds (of say $1 billion), spends $700
million on a presidential palace and the other $300 million on
new highways, is this debt dischargeable? It is debt issued
after the proposed institution labeled the regime illegitimate,
but was used partly for the citizens' benefit. Therefore, can it be
odious debt under the prevailing definition?
The Code's posture in deciding which debts are dischargea-
ble and which are exempt from discharge provides a helpful
guidepost in answering these dilemmas. Under the Authors'
proposed solution, all odious debts are eligible for discharge.
This is similar to how all unsecured prepetition debts are dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy, unless they are exempt. Compara-
bly, there should be sets of odious debts that are exempt from
discharge. 182 The sets of nondischargeable odious debts can
follow a similar categorization as nondischargeable debts
under the U.S. bankruptcy laws.
Recall that nondischargeable debts fall largely into three
categories: (1) familial obligations; (2) debts owed to govern-
mental entities and entities providing educational loans; and
(3) debts resulting from unfair debtor conduct vis-a-vis their
creditors. Similarly, a sovereign's odious debts could fall into
any one of these categories and therefore be exempt from
discharge.
For example, in the hypothetical above where the sovereign
is using thirty percent of the odious debts for the citizens' bene-
fit, is it right to allow discharge? Arguably not. The Code ex-
empts debts from discharge that are familial obligations.
Citizens are functionally equivalent to family members. Provid-
ing for one's family is "beyond question" and a "universalist
181 Cf. KREMER & JAYACHANDRAN, supra note 170, at 7 (recognizing a variation
on this type of problem-legitimate government debt in the hands of an illegiti-
mate government).
182 Otherwise, this proposed solution could be too debtor-friendly, which is
not ideal because an effective fresh start policy seeks to find a middle ground
between an overly-friendly creditor framework and an overly-friendly debtor
framework. See supra section 1.
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sentiment"; likewise it is beyond question and a universalist
sentiment that a sovereign is required to take care of its citi-
zens-as much is required for by international customary
law.183 Therefore, when a sovereign provides services to the
benefit of its family (its citizens), then that portion of the debt
should be exempt from discharge.
The second category of nondischargeable debts should not
be replicated in the odious debt context. As noted above, debts
owed to governmental entities are not eligible for discharge
because of the government's power over the Code. This exemp-
tion does not fulfill any outright moral objective. Therefore, it
would be senseless to replicate this exemption just for the pur-
pose of replicating the exemptions generally.
Lastly, the third category of exemptions exists to ensure
that the debtor's repugnant actions are not rewarded with a
discharge.18 4 For example, assume a government has been
labeled illegitimate. Now all future debts are technically odi-
ous. However, what if during this time a judgment is rendered
against the government for its tortious activity against another;
should this debt be similarly discharged? Arguably not. The
Code, for example, exempts debts acquired through tortious
activity.185 Likewise, an odious debt that is the result of the
sovereign's repugnant behavior should also be exempt from
discharge.
In sum, the prevailing definition of odious debt and the
Authors' proposed solution, which effectively works to dis-
charge odious debt, fits nicely into the Code's existing frame-
work. And where the proposed solution or the definition of
odious debt would lead to confounding outcomes, the Code
provides helpful insights for how to resolve these to achieve
just outcomes. Parsing the fresh start policies helps explain
why an odious debt should be dischargeable and the Code and
the Authors' proposed solution shows how an odious can be
discharged.
CONCLUSION
This Note started with a simple question: should a sover-
eign be eligible for a fresh start and is it possible to provide
them with one? The concept of the fresh start is well-founded
in American jurisprudence. Its adoption was premised on posi-
183 See supra subsection III.B.1.
184 See supra subsection I.B. 1.
185 See supra note 67.
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tive (socio)economic and moral arguments, which showed that
a discharge of certain debts provides an individual with a fresh
start; and incorporating a fresh start makes the individual and
society better off. These same policy arguments also apply to
why the sovereign should receive a fresh start. Additionally,
various legal arguments also support incorporating a fresh
start policy into the sovereign-debt restructuring context.
However, in order to provide a sovereign with a fresh start
there must be a determination of which debts are dischargea-
ble and which debts are not. While agreeing unanimously
about which debts to discharge is politically challenging given
the number of international constituents, at least agreeing that
odious debts are dischargeable is an attainable outcome.
The economic, moral, and legal arguments in support of
discharging odious debts are clearer and more persuasive than
the arguments for discharging sovereign debts generally.
Therefore, it should be politically easier to adopt the odious
debt doctrine. Further, the Authors have proposed a novel
solution wherein odious debts can be discharged if certain
practices and laws are adopted. Their proposal fits within the
odious debt definition, and where it is incomplete, it can be
supported by existing bankruptcy policies and rules. The
Code's policies around which debts to discharge help to fill in
the gaps within the Authors' proposed solution. Consequently,
the answer to the above question is positive: the policy ratio-
nales support a sovereign receiving a fresh start, and a fresh
start can partly be achieved by discharging odious debts.
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